The Government's case for going to war in Iraq has been torn apart by the publication of previously classified evidence that Tony Blair lied over Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.
A devastating attack on Mr Blair's justification for military action by Carne Ross, Britain's key negotiator at the UN, has been kept under wraps until now because he was threatened with being charged with breaching the Official Secrets Act.
In the testimony revealed by the publication of the document on the UK parliament Commons foreign affairs committee website, as the evidence presented by 40 year old Mr Ross, he, who helped negotiate several UN security resolutions on Iraq, makes it clear that Mr Blair must have known Saddam Hussein possessed no weapons of mass destruction. He said that during his posting to the UN, "at no time did British government assess that Iraq's WMD (or any other capability) posed a threat to the UK or its interests."
Damning repudiation of the government's public claims in the run-up to the war is contained in secret evidence to Lord Butler's committee on the abuse of intelligence over Iraq by Carne Ross, who at the time was a diplomat at Britain's UN mission in New York.
Mr Ross revealed it was a commonly held view among British officials dealing with Iraq that any threat by Saddam Hussein had been "effectively contained."
Ross was a member of the FCO from 1989 to 2004, when he resigned after giving evidence to the Butler review. As a member of the so-called "fast stream" of the Diplomatic Service, he served, as head of the Middle East Peace Process section (1995-97), speechwriter to the Foreign Secretary (1997-98), and First Secretary (Political) at the UK Mission to the UN, New York, where he was responsible for the Middle East, and in particular Iraq (1998-2002). He served briefly in Afghanistan after the US/UK invasion and was seconded to the UN mission in Kosovo in 2003-04. By the time he resigned, he had joined the Senior Management Structure of the FCO.
Mr Ross told Lord Butler he read UK and US human and signals intelligence on Iraq every working day during the four years he spent in New York up to 2002, and spoke at length to UN weapons inspectors.
During the Commons Foreign Relations Committee session on 8 November 2006 the communications between the chair of the committee (a labour MP) and Mr Ross is interesting in that it is clear that the chairman is not happy of the revelations and was encouraging Ross to not publish his testimony to Lord Butler.
Chairman: Mr Ross, Black Rod is now approaching to end the proceedings, and that might be a good point at which to conclude our discussions. I say personally that I think that you should take advice before you hand over anything that might get you into problems, despite Mr Mackinlay's protestations.
Andrew Mackinlay: As long as it is on the record
Chairman: Yes, it is on the record.
Andrew Mackinlay: I am surprised. As Chairman, you should be coaxing and encouraging witnesses to give full disclosure, and I hoped that you would do that in discussions with the Clerk.
Chairman: I am trying to ensure that witnesses do not make a decision on the spur of the moment that might have wider consequences without thinking through those consequences.
Andrew Mackinlay: I absolutely agree. It has to stand up in Parliament.
Chairman: It is up to Mr Ross what he chooses to do, but I think that he should give it considered thought rather than give way to being pressured. It is his decision, but I am just saying that as we conclude the proceedings today.
Mr Ross: Mr Chairman, I have given it years of thought. This has been on my conscience for a very long time, and I was waiting for an opportunity under privilege to share my evidence to the Butler inquiry. I would be happy to share it at this point with the Committee.
Chairman: That is fine. That is your decision. Thank you, Mr Ross.
